Optimizely Supply Chain Attack: What Is Confirmed and What to Do
On 16 November 2026, malicious code reached 178 organizations through Optimizely scripts. What happened, what it did, what is still unknown, and what visitors should check.
The Optimizely supply chain attack is an incident on 16 November 2026 in which attackers added malicious JavaScript to scripts served through Optimizely, a website testing and personalization service, so that the code reached visitors of 178 organizations without those organizations being breached directly. The malicious code was built to swap cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skim payment card details and, on some devices, target iPhones and iPads.
What happened
Optimizely lets companies run experiments and personalization on their sites by adding a short snippet that loads code in each visitor's browser. According to reports based on research by Report URI, attackers exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Experimentation and added malicious code to customer projects. Because the code came through a legitimate, trusted delivery channel, visitors of affected sites received it as if it were part of the page.
The activity started around 04:00 UTC on 16 November. Researchers identified 178 organizations and 188 affected snippets, including the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, Equifax, HSBC and IKEA. Optimizely itself is used on roughly 190,000 websites, but that is a measure of how popular the service is, not of how many sites were hit. Being on the list of affected organizations also does not prove that a given visitor was infected.
Optimizely confirmed the incident, said it fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code. Most of the malicious code was reported removed by the evening of 16 November (UTC); sources give slightly different clean-up times, so treat the exact hour as approximate.
What the malicious code did
- Crypto address swapping. The code replaced valid wallet addresses with attacker-controlled ones in page content, in the clipboard and in some outgoing requests. This is the same idea as a clipboard hijacker. Researchers traced about $7,000 in cryptocurrency to the attackers by the evening of 16 November; the real total is not known.
- Card skimming. Code added later that day was designed to capture card numbers, expiry dates and security codes typed into forms the page could read. Payment fields inside isolated third-party frames were not directly exposed.
- Cookies and screenshots. Some readable cookies and screenshots could be sent out. Cookies marked HttpOnly cannot be read by page scripts.
- iPhone and iPad exploits. On some older iOS versions the code tried to deliver exploit kits known as Coruna and DarkSword. No confirmed number of compromised devices has been published.
What is still unknown
- How the attackers gained the ability to change many unrelated customers' projects.
- How many visitors actually loaded the code, and how many cards, devices or wallets were affected.
- Which organizations have notified their visitors.
- Why many affected sites had no effective Content Security Policy, a browser control that limits which scripts a page may run and where it may send data.
What a visitor can do
- Update your iPhone or iPad to the latest iOS or iPadOS, especially if you visited an affected site on 16 November.
- Check crypto transfers made that day. Compare the destination address you sent funds to with the address the recipient gave you through a separate, trusted channel. Make a habit of reading the full address on the confirmation screen, not just the first and last characters. Look-alike addresses are a known trick; see bitcoin address poisoning. You can also check an address for free before sending funds, and read how to check if a wallet address is safe.
- Watch your card statement if you paid on an affected site that day. Turn on transaction alerts and contact your issuer promptly about any charge you do not recognize.
- Look for official notices. Check the company's own status page or security bulletin rather than relying on third-party lists, and keep in mind that a missing notice does not prove a site was safe.
- Keep security software up to date.
What website owners can learn
A trusted script is not automatically a safe script. Security researchers quoted in the coverage recommend keeping an inventory of scripts that run on login and payment pages, limiting where scripts can send data, using a Content Security Policy, and alerting on changes to third-party files. Optimizely customers are advised to review their project JavaScript and rotate users, tokens and integrations that can write to it.
Details in this story are still developing. Verify the current status in several sources, ideally the official statements of the companies you use, because figures and clean-up times may be updated.
Sources
- Malwarebytes: CNN, BBC, Zoom, and other sites served malicious code in supply-chain attack
- TechTarget: Optimizely supply chain attack turns trusted scripts against 178 orgs
- Report URI: World's largest brands infected with malware via Optimizely
- Optimizely incident status page
- HackerNoon: 178 Organizations Served Malware Through Optimizely. What Have the Companies Said?